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Abstract 
The main results of the macro stress testing exercise in 
this paper reveal that Malaysia’s banking sector is 
resilient, well diversified, and highly interconnected. 
Further, Malaysia has a thriving equity market, large bond 
market and growing private debt securities. Main results 
of the baseline scenario suggest a modest change in capital 
ratios; the post-stress test CAR and Tier 1 capital ratio are 
-1.64% and -1.38% respectively. The impact of all 
fundamental shocks on capital ratios under both adverse 
and severely adverse scenarios is significant. The 
aggregate capital shortfall in the form of needed capital 
injection (i.e. cost to the government from failed banks) 
under adverse scenario is 1.55% of the GDP (or $4.59 
billion based on 2015 GDP of $296.22 billion). The 
capitalization needs became more severe in the severely 
adverse scenario, $10.52 billion (or 3.55% of 2015 GDP). 
The important conclusion of the macro stress testing is 
that no bank failed, faced a liquidation or suspension of 
license. 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout the 1990s global liquidity glut1 created an asset boom mania worldwide turning 
ordinary people into avid buyers. This in turn persuaded large banks2 in advanced countries 
and emerging market economies to expand credit offering into very risky segment known as 
the sub-prime via lax and predatory lending (Schwartz, 2009). Subsequently, banks being at 
the epicenter of financial intermediation became contributors to imbalances and receivers of 
adverse impact due to severe pro-cyclicality, on-and off-balance sheet exposures, leverage, 
and shadow banking. After the failure of micro stress tests, used by large private banks and 
the supervisory community3 since the late 1990s, the most recent global financial crisis (GFC) 
marked the birth of macro stress testing4 as a crisis management tool (see Fed, 2009a; b).5  
Propagation of financial crises since the late 1990s has made macro stress testing a central 
focus for the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM)6 to test the resilience of Malaysia’s banking sector 
to extreme but plausible scenarios. Although main results of the macro stress testing exercise 
revealed only a modest change in capital ratios and bank profitability in the baseline scenario, 
macroeconomic events such as the taper tantrum of May followed by the August rout in 2013 
proved that Malaysia’s banking sector and its currency (ringgit)7 were still not immune to 
exogenous shocks. The domineering lesson of the global financial crisis (GFC) revealed that 
banks worldwide gravely failed to differentiate various risk dynamics between structured 
products and bonds. Other important lessons of the GFC have proved that micro stress tests 
conducted by banks and supervisory authorities failed to capture risks related to short-term 
funding liquidity, securitization, interbank contagion and counterparty default (BCBS, 2009).  
                                                          
1 The global savings glut was mainly fostered by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s expansive monetary policies (i.e. cheap dollar) 
in conjunction with the historically low interest rates in the United States and the Euro area (see Bernanke, 2005). 
2 Prior to the GFC (2008), large internationally active banks had constant propensity to circumvent banking regulation and 
supervision via loopholes such as skirting, race to the bottom, de facto versus de jure and cherry picking. 
3 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) monitors microprudential stress testing in over 100 countries. 
4 Micro and macro stress testing are not standalone tools nor do they supplement other tools in the macroeconomic toolkit. 
5 The foundation of this article is the research and conclusions contained in my PhD (e.g. Taskinsoy, 2018).  
6 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) is Malaysia’s central bank.  
7 Bouts of shocks since 2013 rattled markets across the world and caused one of the fastest depreciation of ringgit against 
major currencies  in recent memory (since 2012, ringgit has depreciated as much as 50% of its value against the US dollar). 
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Stress testing is indispensable, but still not failsafe as a standalone tool to measure financial 
stability. It is effective when complemented by value-at-risk (VaR) or stressed VaR. Financial 
crises since the 1980s (i.e. Black Monday of 1987 in the U.S.) have unmistakably shown that 
stress testing is not an early-warning mechanism; to think of it as one would be ill-advised. 
Stress tests as part of a bank’s comprehensive risk management framework can aid bank 
executives in the decision-making process and central banks in monetary policy decisions. 
Macro stress testing was an arcane topic in finance prior to the GFC which markedly unveiled 
the banking sector’s inability to absorb losses in the event of a high-magnitude crisis. As a 
result, the use of macro stress tests as a crisis management tool has developed rather rapidly 
since 20098. The forward-looking aspect of macro stress tests has proved a complement to 
VaR models9 to help detect underlying risks and quantify innumerable vulnerabilities within 
the banking sector and assess its resilience to both endogenous and exogenous shocks under 
highly adverse market conditions mainly triggered by macroeconomic events. The utmost 
objective of the macro stress test constructed in this paper is twofold; to safeguard financial 
stability in Malaysia during both benign and malignant economic times, and to aid prudential 
policy decisions by its central bank (BNM). A top-down macro stress testing framework (e.g. 
Čihák, 2007) is constructed to assess the solvency of Malaysia’s banks and the resilience of 
banking sector in a forward-looking manner. Malaysia’s stress testing experience began with 
the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)10 in response to the first systemic11 
Asian crisis of 1997-98 (see Blaschke et al., 2001 for the early examples of stress tests).    
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to present the main elements of the stress 
testing framework by Čihák (2007); we extend on the model by adding macroeconomic 
                                                          
8 The success of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), undertaken for the first time by the U.S Federal 
Reserve (Fed) in 2009, spurred the use of macro stress testing as a crisis management tool (a similar program was taken in 
parallel by the CEBS and EBA in EU). For details, see Fed (2009), CEBS (2010), and EBA (2011). 
9 VaR is not a standalone tool to measure potential vulnerabilities within the banking sector because VaR results are less 
reliable under extreme but plausible scenarios. Virtually all VaR models focus on the tail-risk which is the lower quantile of 
the distribution of the profit and loss (P&Ls) and answer the question of the largest loss over a specified time horizon at a 
given confidence interval. See Jorion (2001) for a survey of VaR models used. 
10 The FSAP has been initially praised as a forward-looking process for making stress testing systematic and consistently 
applied in the IMF-member countries, but the repeated misleading results such as Iceland FSAP (IMF, 2008) caused loss of 
credibility and left a long lasting scuff on the unblemished reputation of the IMF and the World Bank. 
11 Systemic crisis is not confined to a single country, the contagion of which spreads fast like an epidemic across multiple 
countries that the consequential prevalent financial instability impairs the normal functioning of a financial system to the 
point where many segments of the real economy would suffer materially and financial losses can be so unprecedented. 
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shocks (i.e. unemployment) for conducting macro stress tests. A top-down (TD) stress testing 
approach is carried out where the aggregated actual bank data is employed to address two 
critically important questions: (1) is Malaysia’s banking sector as a whole able to withstand 
the assumed shocks under the two adverse scenarios during the stress testing horizon? (2) 
What would be the potential cost to Malaysia’s government for bailing out failed banks? The 
Malaysia-wide stress test (“MAST”) mainly investigates adverse effects of banks’ exposures 
to credit, interest rate, and foreign exchange risk under extreme but plausible scenarios. The 
MAST exercise primarily attempts to measure the impact on Malaysia’s banking sector using 
one baseline and two adverse scenarios. The outcomes of the analyses are expressed in terms 
of capital adequacy (CAR) or government intervention as a percent of GDP. 
Our empirical work is based on solid foundations. The theoretical and scientific foundation 
of the study, empirical support, and the basis of research can be found in the macroprudential 
regulation and supervision of the banking system and the stress testing literature published 
by the industry participants and experts. More specific studies related to Malaysia have been 
published by the BNM and the multilateral organizations such as the IMF and World Bank. 
We have used reference points for the risk assessment analyses conducted by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), European Banking Authority 
(EBA), Financial Services Authority of the UK, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“the 
Basel Committee”) plus national supervisors for banking regulation and supervision. 
The stress testing horizon of the MAST is three years based on actual bank data from 2013 to 
2015, and covers the entire banking sector consisting of 56 entities as deposit takers. The 
benchmark CAR of 10.5% and the hurdle Tier 1 capital ratio of 6.0% were used. The aggregate 
CAR and Tier 1 capital ratio prior to the start of MAST were comfortably high; 15.04% and 
13.30% respectively. A bank falling below either ratio is considered at the risk of insolvency, 
and would be required to raise fresh capital in order to comply with the regulatory capital 
minima. The results of the MAST are expressed in terms of independent variables (CAR and 
capital injection as a percent of GDP). The key results of the MAST indicate that Malaysia’s 
financial sector is well diversified, highly interconnected and its regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks are consistently resilient to shocks under acute financial stress. 
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The stress testing scenarios developed and employed in the MAST are hypothetical rather 
than forecasts. The baseline scenario follows a normal course of economic activity which is 
consistent with the latest IMF World Economic Outlook projections for Malaysia (i.e. 5% GDP 
growth). Both hypothetical but plausible adverse and severely adverse scenarios assume a 
recession, slower economic recovery, and high unemployment. The main results of the MAST 
are merely indications based on assumptions and trajectories for a number of key variables 
describing the nature of economic activity in Malaysia which may or may not reflect the views 
of the BNM, actual developments or market events domestically and globally. 
Malaysia has a thriving equity market, a large bond market (the largest within the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN-5), and growing private debt securities. Nevertheless, 
some restrictions still exist in the financial sector where the Malaysian government has a 
substantial controlling stake including explicit and implicit guarantees. The BNM must have 
the utmost responsibility as well as accountability to monitor the levels of private corporate 
and household indebtedness. Excessive leverage in these two segments put strain on banking 
sectors and cause unbearable burden on households. It is not alarmingly concerning yet, but 
Malaysia should work proactively towards reducing the level of foreign claims to avoid a 
deleveraging process in the event of an acute financial distress. Moreover, Malaysia’s banking 
operation abroad (about one-third of the GDP) should be subject to rigorous monitoring, this 
may require the BNM to initiate cooperation in the host countries to ensure no escaping from 
its banking regulation and supervision. Despite a growing criticism, some market distortions 
still exist (i.e. tax incentives are provided for the Islamic finance); the BNM needs to eliminate 
such deficiencies and on a regular basis improve both quality and quantity of capital. 
1.1 A Historical Perspective on Financial Stability 
Financial crises are not instant; on the contrary, they evolve over time via manifestations of 
protracted (nocuous at times) interactions with linkages between bank intermediation and 
the broader economy. Financial instability and ensuing crises can stem from a wide spectrum 
of sources involving an amalgam of high-magnitude events that are complex, multifaceted, 
and systemic in nature (Claessens & Kose, 2013). Crockett (1997) asserts that monetary and 
financial stability are the two integral components of a normal-functioning financial system, 
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Borio (2003) calls it “twin stability”. Alternatively, Minsky (1975) strongly argues that cyclical 
excesses leads to financial instability (i.e. the Fed’s expansive monetary stand). Monetarists 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Eichengreen (2002), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) believe 
that both policy errors and ineffective policy decisions may foster financial instability. 
It would be edifying to look at the past century. The world trade (1870-1910), underpinned 
by the classical gold standard12, was hugely disrupted by World War-I (WWI) that changed 
the power structure in Europe and re-defined the pattern of world trade. At the turn of the 
19th century (1890s) before the United States entered the scene of dominance, the power 
structure in Europe was shared by Germany, France, and Britain who were each other’s chief 
enemy. Prolongation of the protectionist policies, currency blocks, and restricted trade zones 
put in place by each of these major powers elicited constant rivalries among them which are 
regarded as causal contributors to the sudden eruption of WWI; and severe consequences 
emanated from the unresolved issues of WWI eventually led to the outbreak of World War II. 
The adequate supply of gold, on-and-off, had been a problem in the classical gold standard; 
as a solution, this was replaced by a gold exchange making the British sterling and the U.S. 
dollar as reserve currencies for gold shortage (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010a; Estevadeordal et 
al., 2003; and Lopez-Cordova & Meissner, 2003). Unresolved issues of WWI culminated in the 
banking crisis triggered by speculative attacks on British pound subsequently forced Britain 
to leave the gold standard in 1931. Among many others, Bernanke and James (1991) and 
Eichengreen (2003) strongly argue that Britain’s decision to drop gold arguably contributed 
to the Great Depression13 which forced countries (the U.S. in particular) to pass isolationist 
“beggar-the-neighbor”14 policies that severely disrupted the world trade in the 1930s.15  
                                                          
12 The gold standard was officially inaugurated in 1844 by the British Empire which marked the new beginning in trade 
where British pound sterling was fully backed by gold. By 1908, most countries adopted gold standard, but after Britain 
dropping gold standard in 1931, countries in Europe were off-gold by 1936 (see Kindleberger & Alibar 2005). 
13 The Great Depression has been described as “…by far the worst catastrophe of the 20th century” (Wheelock, 2007). 
14 These isolationist policies were passed by countries to resolve their own economic problems at the expense of other 
nations. The United States passed more policies in this nature in the 1930s than any country (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010b). 
15 However, Monetarists Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provide a compelling argument that falling money stock in the U.S 
was the driving force behind the severe contraction in consumption that in turn caused a chain reaction for the steady state 
output to plummet (more than 30%), prices to free-fall (more than half), unemployment to soar (25% of Americans out of 
a job), and thousands of banks to fail. These unfolding events actually caused the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
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In the U.S., the dark and devious side of investment banking activities of commercial banks 
(e.g. Lardner, 2009) leading up to the Great Depression made investors and the American 
public lose trust in the entire financial system (Crawford, 2011; Mester, 1996). To restore 
confidence, the U.S. authorities quickly responded to the outcry by the American public with 
the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act (or the Banking Act of 1933) which was drafted by US 
Senator Carter Glass and Representative Henry Steagall.16 The motivation behind the act was 
to make the banking system in the United States more resilient through two important 
objectives; the separation of commercial banking from investment banking to ensure that 
banks’ assets were not used inappropriately by diverting funds into some other speculative 
purposes (commercial banks were barred from underwriting securities); second, create an 
independent Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) under the Federal Reserve; previously, 
the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) was in charge of national bank liquidations. 
After WWII broke out in September 1939, Harry Dexter White (the U.S.) and John Maynard 
Keynes (the UK) began working on respective monetary plans in the outset of 1940.17 The 
Bretton Woods Conference (1944) gave birth to a new monetary system proposed by the U.S. 
and its decision to establish the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
Although Keynes strongly argued against the use of a fixed exchange rate regime pegged to 
the U.S. dollar (Helpman 1981), his proposal of a supranational currency and the creation of 
two watchdog institutions were overwhelmingly rejected (Schumacher, 1943). With the US 
dollar as the new reserve currency marked the beginning of U.S. hegemony, and many fixed 
currencies became free-floating (see Ruggie, 1982). In the aftermath of WWII, the U.S. was by 
far the most dominant18 industrial power in the world, provided that no competition from 
the war-devastated Europe and Japan which were completely destroyed by the war.  
                                                          
16 After the Federal Reserve failed to avoid the Great Depression; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was 
established and Social Security System was initiated. Also, the first national minimum wage law was ratified, and the federal 
government spending rose from 3% of GDP then to 10%, now 20% (Wheelock, 2007). 
17 Keynes (“Baron Keynes”), the distinguished economist and leader of the British delegation at the Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1944, publicly criticized White’s plan for its narrow focus on unresolved issues and immediate postwar 
problems such as Germany’s reparations from WWI, undisrupted world trade, and unrestricted currencies. 
18 The U.S. nearly produced two-thirds of the world’s total manufacturing output helped by almost full employment (see 
Becker, 1964; Keesing, 1966). Extraordinary production capacity and output transformed the U.S. from a net importer 
(historically) to a net exporter in the late 1940s (Branson et al., 1980). 
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While different monetary proposals of the Bretton Woods system (e.g. Moggridge, 1980) 
were being drafted at the onset of 1940, ASEAN-519 countries were colonized or occupied by 
foreign powers. Furthermore, each founding member of the ASEAN-5 was invaded by Japan 
during WWII (1942-45). For instance, Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch (the 1800s-
1945), Malaysia by the British (1824-1946), and the Philippines by the Americans (1898-
1946). Interestingly, Thailand had never been colonized but instead faced several military 
dictatorships for four decades (1932-73). In the post WWII era, ASEAN-5 nations one after 
another declared independency starting with Indonesia in August 17, 1945; Philippines in 
July 4, 1946; Malaysia in August 31, 1957.20; and Singapore in August 9, 1965.21 
Economists and historians suggest that the Bretton Woods system was destined to fail due 
to unrealistic promises and many overlooked issues (governance).22 The foreseen collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system resulted in significant volatility in major foreign exchange markets 
in the 1970s (see Mundell & Swoboda, 1969 for monetary problems). This quickly turned 
into a worldwide financial turmoil in the wake of two other high-magnitude events causing 
enormous disruptions to the world trade and financial stability. First was the Yom Kippur 
War23 (1973) and ensuing oil crisis (1974-78); the second event was the closure and forced 
liquidation of Germany’s Cologne-based Bankhaus Herstatt (1974).24 These macro events 
and their farfetched implications resulted in unprecedented spikes in commodity prices by 
the mid-1970s during which the prices of both gold and oil broke records.25 Hazlitt (1984) 
argues that the instability episodes were the “…consequence of the inherently inflationary 
institutions set up in 1944” (i.e. the IMF and the World Bank) and the Bretton Woods system 
                                                          
19 ASEAN-5 stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (the five founding member-nations in alphabetical order 
are; Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).  
20 Malaysia was formed in 1963 consisting of one-third of Borneo, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore; however, Singapore was 
forced to withdraw from the federation in 1965, which in the same year declared its independency. 
21 Singapore’s decision to separate from Malaysia to become an independent sovereign state was the result of a long lasting 
political tensions between the two countries’ ruling parties. There were also deep economic differences between them.  
22 See Siklos (2013) for issues with the international financial regulation. 
23 This was a follow-up retaliation by the Egyptian and Syrian forces to win back territory lost to Israel during the Arab-
Israeli war in 1967. Each side claimed victories but in reality the Yom Kippur war was a disaster for Syria.  
24 The sudden bankruptcy of a small privately-owned Bankhaus Herstatt in June 1974 is a famous as well as a shocking 
incident that clearly illustrated the settlement risk in foreign exchange payments, plus ignored regulatory issues. 
25 OPEC sharply raised oil prices during 1973-74 to show its strong disapproval of the U.S. aid to Israel during the war. By 
March 1974, the price of oil rose from $3/barrel to $12/barrel. The price of gold rose from $44/ounce in 1972 to $185 in 
1975 (see Kindleberger & Alibar, 2005 for the reasons behind the huge spike). 
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“…not only permits and encourages but almost compels world inflation”. Dooley et al. (2004) 
stress that “Bretton Woods system does not evolve; it just occasionally reloads a periphery”. 
The severity of financial and political turbulence in the 1970s fostered by the aforementioned 
instability-inflicting events forced the G-10 Governors26 to engage in financial collaboration 
and cooperation, which gave an imminent birth to the creation of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision in 1974. To converge the existing disparate capital standards across G-
10, the Basel Committee published the 1988 Capital Accord (known as Basel I), “International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards” (BCBS, 1988). Elizalde (2007) 
and Jones (2000) criticize Basel I for not only ushering riskier lending but encouraging capital 
arbitrage. Ferguson (2003) emphasizes that “Basel I Accord is too simplistic to adequately 
address the activities of our most complex banking institutions”. Jackson et al. (1999) argue 
that Basel I is another undue regulatory taxation imposed on banks.27 
The drawback of Basel I was that it predominantly focused on credit risk while ignoring other 
important elements such as the supervisory review process and market discipline. To correct 
the overly criticized flaws of Basel I, and more specifically, to increase the sensitiveness to 
risk, the Basel Committee published a new revised framework in June 2004 (known as Basel 
II), fully implemented by the end of 2006: “International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework” (see BCBS, 2004 for details). On the contrary to 
expectations, Basel II further augmented procyclicality and turned too-big-to-fail banks into 
bigger-and harder-to-fail banks. Moreover, Basel II allowed the creation of shadow banking 
by giving large banks incentives to move assets off their balance sheets. Probably the worst 
effect of Basel II was to make banks overly rely on the external credit assessment institutions 
(ECAIs) ratings for decisions on audit frequency, dividend payout, and deposit rates. This last 
point in turn made banks feel the least urgency to allocate funds to strengthen their existing 
risk-management frameworks or develop far better ones. 
                                                          
26 From Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States. 
27 Five arbitrary risk weighting categories and corresponding risk buckets (0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and 100%) under Basel I 
for credit risk had adverse effects on financial sectors of the ASEAN-5 prior to the Asian crisis (see BCBS, 1999a;b). 
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Each milestone in the stress testing evolution has often corresponded with financial crises 
since the late 1990s, and the introduction of Basel Accords (II and III) followed a similar path 
during the same period. Once an arcane topic but now a common household name, micro 
stress testing has gained prominence in the late 1990s, but macro stress testing has become 
indispensable as a crisis management tool on account of the 2008 credit crisis (GFC). Details 
of the earlier stress testing practices employed by banks and regulatory supervisors and this 
paper’s topic macro stress testing will be covered in the Literature Review section.  
2. Literature Review 
In the post Second War (WWII) era, financial markets were relatively small and the coverage 
for pure financial risk was in infancy stages. Insurance policy was predominantly used as a 
protection against financial losses resulting from work related incidents or environmental 
catastrophes.  The publication of the five seminal papers28 instigated the evolution of finance 
to accelerate at a remarkable pace. Prior to the Asian crisis of 1997-98, intensifying financial 
turmoil by the mid-1990s prompted the Basel Committee to release the 1996 market risk 
Amendment to Basel I (BCBS 1996a; b) requiring large banks to use backtesting. However the 
deficiencies and imperfect signals generated by backtesting (Campbell, 2005), stress testing 
became a mainstay when banks with substantial trading volumes were required to use stress 
testing to confirm the accuracy of VaR, Jorion (2001) calls this process “a reality check”.29 
The typology of stress testing is categorized along two dimensions: micro-prudential and 
macro-prudential. Microprudential stress testing30 (BU: bottom-up) is employed by banks 
for internal risk management purposes and by regulatory supervisors for pillar II solvency. 
Macroprudential stress testing (both BU and TD: top-down) is employed by central banks 
and the supervisory community for assessing the entire financial system and by the IMF for 
country-level surveillance. Starting with the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program of the 
                                                          
28 Markowitz’s (1952, 1959) portfolio theory (mean-variance criterion); Modigliani-Miller’s (1958) irrelevance and 
arbitrage-reasoning; Sharpe’s (1964) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); Black and Scholes’ (1973) option pricing formula; 
and Merton’s (1974) pricing of corporate debt (arbitrage-based pricing model). 
29 Interested readers can further read studies such as CGFS (2000, 2001, and 2005) that surveyed major and large financial 
institutions for their uses of earlier stress testing (i.e. microprudential). 
30 The Basel Committee required banks to use internally designed stress tests in the late 1990s and the use of micro stress 
testing became mandatory under Basel II; under Basel III, banks are required to use enhanced stress testing approaches. 
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U.S. in 2009, macroprudential stress tests (BU) are used as a crisis management tool. There 
is also liquidity stress testing but it is still in infancy stage and not linked to bank solvency. 
Greenspan (1998), the US Fed Chairman then, in his testimony to the U.S. Congress on January 
26 warned that “…significant mistakes in macroeconomic policy also reverberate around the 
world at a prodigious pace’’.  Asian crisis of 1997-98 may have been the inevitable outcome 
of such policies’ adverse effects; Alan Greenspan indicated in 1998 that foreign investors in 
Asian equities (excluding those in Japan) lost an estimated $700 billion-including $30 billion 
by American investors (Nanto, 1998). Throughout the 1990s, macro events’ massive costs to 
economies prompted the IMF and the World Bank jointly to initiate the FSAP in 1999.31 Even 
though Malaysia now conducts its own micro and macro stress tests, it underwent its first 
macro stress testing experience via FSAP. The main results of Malaysia’s latest FSAP indicate 
that its economy is robust with a sound financial system helped by a continued flow of funds 
amid the GFC, but there has been a slow and persistent deterioration since 2013. High levels 
of public finances, overexpansion of credit and excessive household debt are disquieting, plus 
the subdued inflation has moved up after the minimum wage law in 2013 (IMF, 2014). 
The IMF’s FSAP, as part of its surveillance program known as Article IV Consultation, was 
primarily established “...to help countries enhance their resilience to crises and foster growth 
by promoting financial stability and financial sector diversity” (IEO, 2004). Hilbers (2001) 
sees three components of an FSAP as critical; (1) an assessment of micro/macro prudential 
reforms and development needs; (2) an assessment of vulnerabilities to macroeconomic and 
financial factors; (3) an assessment of the existing, laws, rules, codes, regulation, and banking 
supervision. Although the IMF’s FSAP has been initially praised as a forward-looking process 
for making stress testing systematic and consistently applied in the IMF-member countries, 
but the misleading results of Iceland’s FSAP (IMF, 2008) caused not only loss of credibility 
but left a long-lasting scuff on the unblemished reputation of the IMF and the World Bank 
(see IMF & World Bank, 2003 for tools; IMF & World Bank, 2005a; b for the lessons learned).32 
                                                          
31 The focus of FSAP assessments is twofold: to assess the resilience of the financial sector to endogenous and exogenous 
shocks and to measure the financial sector’s potential contribution to growth and development of non-financial sectors. 
32 An extensive review of the program’s processes was initiated after overhauling of banking systems (i.e. Irish bank system) 
and collapsing banks (i.e. Belgium’s Dexia) shortly after passing FSAPs and EU-wide stress tests in 2010 and 2011. 
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The contemporaneous financial crises in the new millennium have unmistakably proved that 
individual banks’ micro stress tests for the internal risk management purposes had serious 
deficiencies; they were both inadequate (not bank-wide) and insufficient (light scenarios 
generated results by design) to prevent a high-magnitude financial crisis similar to the GFC. 
The Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS)33 investigated the use of stress tests 
through 424 stress tests performed by 43 large internationally active banks and securities 
firms from ten countries. The overall conclusion of the CGFS survey reveals the importance 
of stress testing as a valuable tool to gauge and manage risks (CGFS, 2000). Most frequently 
used stress testing technique among these institutions in 2000 was the simple sensitivity test 
to measure the adverse impact of changes in a single risk factor on portfolios or business 
units. The second popular stress testing technique used was a scenario analysis (i.e. historical 
or/and hypothetical) to measure risk exposures under extreme but plausible market events. 
The domineering lesson of the latest global financial meltdown during 2007-08 revealed that 
banks gravely failed to differentiate common risk dynamics of the modern finance between 
structured products and bonds; further, micro stress tests conducted by banks and the 
supervisory authorities failed to capture key risks such as pipeline, securitization, short-term 
funding liquidity, interbank contagion and counterparty default (see BCBS, 2009 for details). 
Another shortcoming of the earlier micro stress tests was that they had a narrow focus in 
scope and the health of the financial system as a whole or the buildup of systemic risk was 
never a concern. International Institute of Finance argues that “during the market turbulence, 
the magnitude of losses at many firms made it clear that their stress testing methodologies 
needed refinement – stress testing was not consistently applied, too rigidly defined, or 
inadequately developed (IIF, 2008). The stress testing literature vividly illustrates that micro 
stress tests prior to the GFC had weaknesses under extreme market conditions and the not 
have the sufficient capacity to cope with the subsequent unfolding events. According to the 
Basel Committee, this huge oversight on the part of financial authorities contributed to the 
intensity of the GFC (e.g. BCBS, 2009). In the post-GFC (since 2009), macro stress testing as a 
crisis management tool is used virtually by all central banks to measure financial stability 
                                                          
33   The CGFS is a central bank forum, established by the Governors of the G-10 central banks to monitor and examine broad 
issues relating to global financial markets. 
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and systemic risk. To date, IMF has completed about 130 of 188 member-FSAPs, but it is a 
slow-moving process. As an improvement, the IMF has expanded its initial goal of one FSAP 
per month to 24 FSAPs per year, but the current rate is still 17 to 19 per year (IMF, 2004). 
The voluntary nature of FSAP has been criticized since the GFC. The proponents argue that 
countries voluntarily choosing to undergo FSAP or not may potentially impose instability on 
the global financial system. On that note, the US, Indonesia, and Malaysia did not undergo nor 
requested to participate in an FSAP prior to the GFC. Malaysia initially refused to participate 
in the IMF administered program due to its resentments towards the IMF’s policy responses 
handling the Asian crisis. A widely perceived belief suggests that interest rate hikes along 
with inappropriate fiscal measures of the IMF during and in the aftermath of the Asian crisis 
acted as a crisis’ intensifier role causing further turmoil in Malaysia’s economy. Many argue 
that, giving the state of economies and frail banking systems, the IMF should have at least 
raised interest rates moderately and fiscal targets should have been less rigid. IMF defended 
its actions by arguing that policy choices were limited without alternatives.34 
The success of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), undertaken for the first 
time by the Fed in 2009 spurred the use of macro stress testing by central banks as a crisis 
management tool (see Fed, 2009a for design and implementation; 2009b for results details). 
In stark contrast to the US, Europe bungled with its first two macro stress tests designed and 
conducted by the CEBS (2010) and its successor EBA (2011). The SCAP was informative, 
which provided credible and market-demanded information regarding the projected post-
stress losses (Bernanke, 2013). However, results of the EU-wide stress tests conducted by 
the CEBS and the EBA were widely perceived as insufficiently granular. According to Ellahie 
(2012), the stress test conducted by the CEBS, in most part, was uninformative and its partial 
disclosure caused a decline in equity values in Europe (CEBS, 2010). Beltratti (2011) believes 
that the EBA’s macro stress test in 2011 had issues as well but it was nonetheless informative 
in terms of methodologies and scenarios used. Tarullo (2010) contends that stress tests can 
stand a chance of succeeding if the rigor is absent in the design of exceptional but plausible 
scenarios that must be consistent and comparable. Wall (2013) argues that one of the success 
                                                          
34 The GFC has proved that the predecessors of Basel III (i.e. I & II) along with microprudential stress testing used by banks, 
supervisors, and multilateral organizations failed gravely to strengthen the resilience of the global financial system.   
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attributes of the SCAP was a backstop (i.e. temporary financial relief) provided by the U.S. 
Treasury which enabled the regulatory supervisors to identify the tail risks better.  
Bernanke (2013) states that macro stress tests are “forward-looking” providing protection 
against “so-called tail risks”. The Basel Committee argues that adequately designed macro 
stress tests with extreme but plausible scenarios “…improve banking sectors’ ability to 
absorb shocks arising from an acute financial and economic stress” (BCBS, 2010). Two 
strands of macro stress testing models exist; (i) models that link macro variables to micro 
risk drivers (i.e. credit risk); (ii) and integrated models that take into account liquidity risk 
and feedback effects (Foglia, 2009). Macroeconomic models do not deal with financial sector 
variables, therefore satellite models such as reduced-form are employed to map macro 
shocks into measurable form (i.e. asset quality). In BU stress tests, banks compute loss 
distributions on a provided scenario and then send the results to the central bank for 
aggregation (Sorge, 2004). The Basel Committee stresses that both BU and TD approaches 
should be used to capture second-round liquidity and systemic effects (BCBS, 2013). 
The successful initiatives of the ten-year Financial Sector Masterplan (2001–2010) led by the 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) and the parallel-run Capital Market Masterplan (CMP1) led by 
the Securities Commission, Malaysia has escaped the severe consequences of the GFC with a 
minor dent in its economy. Malaysia’s financial sector went through great transformation 
since the Asian crisis. Asia’s systemically induced home-grown crisis in the late 1990s forced 
Malaysia to initiate widespread micro and macro-prudential reforms. The end result of the 
relentless efforts is a strengthened financial sector complemented by a rigorous regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks. The stress tests conducted by both BNM and IMF indicate that 
Malaysia’s banking system is well capitalized, therefore it is resilient to withstand economic 
and market shocks, but not absent from risks. Malaysian banks’ heavy reliance on demand 
deposits increases liquidity risk, rising household debt increases default risk (IMF, 2013). 
Despite a decade-long highly praised micro and macroprudential reforms introduced by BNM 
and other government authorities, the farfetched implications of the GFC clearly proved that 
Malaysia is still disquietingly susceptible to developments in G-2 (the U.S. and EU). As such, 
policy normalization in the United States, the Federal Reserve’s interest rate lift-off by 25 bps 
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in December of 2015, and the increased probability of another rate hike by the Fed in end-
2016 stirred Malaysia’s equity market and made its currency (ringgit) plummet against the 
dollar, in fact ringgit’s depreciation against dollar was the fastest in 17 years. Other macro 
events such as the slow-growth path of China, global imbalances, accommodative monetary 
policies and reemerged weaknesses in the Euro area contribute to the volatility.  
Malaysia’s well-diversified economy is expected to experience a noticeable decline; low oil 
and gas prices will keep inflationary pressures subdued and cause a sizable reduction in the 
current account surplus. However, revenue loss due to lower commodity prices is expected 
to be offset by the elimination of the oil subsidies and manufacturing exports favored by a 
weaker exchange. Surging house prices and fast rising household debt in Malaysia remain to 
pose a threat to financial stability, this may even lead to the formation of a real estate bubble. 
Although rising real interest rates globally will curb the growth of financial risks eventually, 
enhanced stress tests along with macroprudential measures may be necessary (IMF, 2015). 
3. Research Method 
Since the banking operation is at the epicenter of any financial intermediation, there is no 
perfect substitute for it in capital markets; thus, the broader economic activity is adversely 
affected during financial turmoil. In the aftermath of the most unprecedented global financial 
crisis of 2007-08, the BNM has used macro stress testing as a measure of financial crisis. 
Malaysia-wide stress test (“MAST”) is based on a top-down (TD) stress testing approach 
consisting of one baseline (not a real stress scenario, mostly used for adjustment purposes) 
and two adverse scenarios; the main results of all three stress scenarios are informative to 
central banks, supervisors, bank executives, and academia.  
This paper focuses on the macro stress testing of Malaysia’s banking sector to assess its 
resilience to extreme but plausible scenarios (see Figure 1 for the stress testing framework). 
Some of the main research methods have been utilized; as such, the analysis and synthesis 
methods, induction, deduction, and analogy. Also, research methods such as factorial and 
comparative analysis, statistical and mathematical methods are used. For the purpose of an 
econometric study, specific macroprudential banking data was compiled from various 
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sources including but not limited to bankscope, central bank databases, World Bank, the IMF 
FSAPs, Eurostat, the Basel Committee, and individual banks’ websites (Taskinsoy, 2018). 
The paper follows the stress testing model developed by Čihák (2007); as an improvement, 
actual bank data is used in the Malaysia-wide stress test as opposed to hypothetical banks 
and banking data. A top-down (TD) macro stress testing approach is employed with the 
objective of assessing credit, interest rate, and exchange rate risks under one baseline and 
two adverse scenarios. The focus of measure is on the aggregate impact resulting from tighter 
capital and liquidity regulation of Basel III plus the assumed macro shocks, and how to 
express them in terms of capital adequacy and capital injection as percentage of GDP. The 
stress testing horizon of the MAST is three years based on annual data from 2013 to 2015 
(Q4), and covers the entire banking sector consisting of 56 entities as deposit takers. As of 
end-2015, 31 domicile banks controlled MR1.82 trillion of the total financial assets (18 banks 
owned 74.6% or RM1.74 trillion and 13 investment banks owned 3.26% or RM84 billion). 
Domestically incorporated foreign-controlled banks (25) enjoyed 22.26% (or RM520 billion) 
of the consolidated banking assets. Malaysia’s five largest banks account over 70% of the total 
financial assets, consistent with that in advanced economies (IMF, 2013; 2015). 
Stress testing is overly misunderstood and often confused with macroeconomic forecasting and 
early-warning indicators. Before explaining in detail the important elements of the macro stress 
test used in this thesis, it would be informative to outline the conceptual differences between them. 
The following is based on Sorge (2004), macroeconomic forecasting can be described as; 
E x	 = g X, Z   
Where t represents the history of past events of a random variable up to time (t); gis the forecasting 
function that maps variables X and other factors Z into a vector of expected outcomes that take 
place in the future. An early-warning indicators model is described as; 
P x ≥ x	 = g X, Z   
The problem with an early-warning mechanism is to identify subsets of X and Z as leading signals 
to predict the probability of a future crisis. When some critical macroeconomic variables (X) go 
over the pre-set thresholds, a crisis occurs (i.e. xt+1 ≥ x ) and no crisis if x  ≤ x.  
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The underlying difference between stress testing and the other two is that early-warning indicators 
and macroeconomic forecasting models use historical data as an input, but micro or macro stress 
tests use historical or/and hypothetical scenarios along with several assumptions as inputs to assess 
how individual banks or banking sectors can withstand extreme but plausible shocks which have 
not yet occurred. The consequences of x ≥ x can be evaluated as; 
Ω Y / x ≥ x = f X, Z   
Where Y / x ≥ x is the aggregate measure of the distress of the financial system (Y) 
restricted to the tail events (x ≥ x). Ω (.), denotes the metric used to compare the vulnerabilities 
of the financial system across portfolios and scenarios.     
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Source: Taskinsoy (2018); adapted from Borio et al. (2012); Buncic and Melecky (2012) 
Notes: The proposed macro stress testing framework shows a sequence of developments and the steps were considered in the pre-design of the macro stress test 
undertaken in this paper. Because any banking operation revolves around a constant inventory of risks, in order to choose an appropriate model (i.e. a sensitivity 
test or a scenario analysis), all pertinent risks must be clearly specified (i.e. micro factors, macro factors, or systemic factors). Stress tests can focus on the impact of 
individual risk types (i.e. PDs, LGDs, and EPDs; as well as credit, interest rate, and liquidity risks) or systemic (i.e. on-balance and off-balance sheet exposures) risk 
on bank capital, lending spreads and steady state output. Once the nature of impact and its spillover effects on banks and the broader economy are determined, 
these can be used as inputs in specifications of stress tests scenarios. 
Figure 1: Overview of Macroprudential Stress Testing Framework 
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3.1 Measure and Scale of Variables 
The macro-financial parameters must meet two conditions of properties (see Table 1); (1) in 
assessing the soundness of a banking sector, variables should be measurable/quantifiable, 
interpretable as well as comparable with other variables; (2) variables should be linked to a 
number of different risk factors so that econometrics, analytical, and statistical analyses can 
be performed. A list of commonly used variables is adopted from Čihák (2007). 
Capital is a key measure of impact due to its close link as well as implications on solvency, 
but capital as a standalone variable is not a clear indication of vulnerability to shocks in an 
acute stress. To make capital a critical variable in the measurement of financial soundness, it 
needs to be viewed as a ratio (i.e. Tier 1 capital / RWAs or capital as percent of GDP). 
Three important capital ratios used in stress tests as variables are the following: 
CET1 Ratio = CET1 Capital / RWAs = 4.5%    
(3.1.1) Tier 1 Capital Ratio = Total Tier 1 Capital / RWAs = 6% 
Total Capital Ratio = (Tier 1 Capital + Tier 2 Capital) / RWAs = 8% 
Where CET1 represents common equity Tier 1 capital, RWA is the risk-weighted asset 
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is used as a key variable and calculated as; 
CAR = RC / (CRWA + MRWA + ORWA) = p (i.e. 10.5%)     (3.1.2) 
Where RWA denotes risk-weighted assets (i.e. RWA = ∑ W%A&); RC is the regulatory capital, 
CRWA is the risk-weighted credit risk, MRWA is the risk-weighted market risk, ORWA is the 
risk-weighted operational risk (see Table 2), and p is the minimum CAR used in the paper. 
The constituents of capital changed significantly from Basel II to Basel III (see Table 3 for the 
Basel III phase-in arrangements). Capital adequacy and Tier 1 capital ratios are critically 
important financial stability indicators (FSIs). The threshold rate of 10.50% CAR is 2.5% 
higher than the total capital requirement of 8% under Basel III. This hurdle rate is also 
significantly higher than all of the micro and macro stress tests conducted in the U.S., Europe, 
and Japan. Using the above equations, RWAs are computed as; 
RWA = p 10.50%	  ∗ CRWA + MRWA + ORWA	 + 0 W&A& (3.1.3) 
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Table 1: Crisis Stress Tests: Macro-Financial Parameters Scorecard 
Parameter Application to Stress Tests  
Variable Indicator US European Union Ireland Spain 
SCAP 
2009 
CEBS 
2009 
CEBS 
2010 
EBA 
2011 
PCAR 
2011 
FSAP 
2012 
TD 
2012 
BU 
2012 
Growth 
Real GDP x x x x x x x x 
Real GNP     x    
Nominal GDP      x x x 
Employment 
Unemployment x x x x x x x x 
Employment     x    
Price 
evolution 
CPI  2/  x x x x x 
HICP    x x    
GDP deflator     x x x x 
Consumption 
Private      x    
Government     x    
Trade 
Exports     x    
Imports     x    
Balance of 
payments 
    x    
Income and 
investment 
Investment     x    
Personal 
disposable 
income 
    x    
Real estate 
Real estate prices x x x x x x x x 
  Comm. property  x x x x    
  Resid. property  x x x x x x x 
  Land       x x 
Interest rate 
Up to 1 year 
Up to 5 year 
More than 5 
years 
 2/ x x  x x x 
 2/     x x 
 2/ x x  x x x 
Exchange 
rate 
Relative to 
U.S. dollar 
 2/ x x  x x x 
Stock market Stock price index  2/ x x  x x x 
Credit to 
other 
resident 
sectors 
Households      x x x 
Non-financial 
corporate 
     x x x 
Source: Ong & Pazarbasioglu (2013) 
2/     Information not disclosed. 
Notes: Macro-financial parameters used in stress tests are widely disparate. This scorecard shows what macro 
parameters were used by the U.S., European Union, Spain, and Ireland.  
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Table 2: Crisis Stress Tests: Risk Factors Scorecard 
Risk Factor Application to Stress Tests 
Risk 
type 
N
at
u
re
 o
f 
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g  
Exposures US European Union Ireland Spain 
SCAP 
2009 
CEBS 
2009 
CEBS 
2010 
EBA 
2011 
PCAR 
2011 
FSAP 
2012 
TD 
2012 
BU 
2012 
C
re
d
it
 R
is
k 
... 
Residential mortgage x 1/ x x x x x x 
   First lien x        
   Second lien x        
Commercial / 
industrial loans 
x        
Corporate loans  1/ x x x x x x 
RE developers      x x x 
SME loans    x x  x x 
CRE loans    x x    
Fin. inst. loans  1/ x x     
Consumer loans  
(including credit 
cards) 
x 1/ x x x  x x 
Revolving loans    x     
Public works       x x 
Sovereign exposure 
in available-for-sale 
(AfS) banking book 
   x     
Other loans x        
M
ar
ke
t 
R
is
k 
T
ra
d
in
g 
b
oo
k 
Sovereign portfolio x 1/ x x x x   
Financial ins. 
portfolio 
x 1/ x x x x   
Other securities (MBS 
and other ABS) 
x    x    
Private equity holding x        
Counterparty credit 
exposures to OTC 
derivatives 
x        
B
an
ki
n
g 
b
oo
k 
(A
fS
) 
Sovereign portfolio x     x   
Financial ins. 
portfolio 
x     x   
Other securities (MBS 
and other ABS) 
x    x    
B
an
ki
n
g 
b
oo
k 
(H
tM
) 
Sovereign portfolio x        
Financial ins. 
portfolio 
x        
Other securities (MBS 
and other ABS) 
x    x    
Operational Risk    x x    
Separate liquidity test    2/ x x   
Source: Ong & Pazarbasioglu (2013) 
1/     Information not disclosed, HtM: Hold to maturity, AfS: Available for sale  
2/     The EBA conducted a confidential thematic review of liquidity funding risks. 
Notes: Deciding the right risk factors to stress test is very crucial, therefore choosing wrong risk factors will adversely 
affect the outcome and may result in further losses. This scorecard shows the risk types stress tested by the U.S., 
European Union, Spain, and Ireland. Again, this is very important as a roadmap.       
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Table 3: Basel III Phase-in Arrangements 
Shading in grey indicates transition periods – all dates are as of January 1st 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
Leverage ratio 
Parallel run 2013 – 2017 
Disclosure starts 2015 
 
Migration to 
Pillar 1 (2018) 
Minimum CET1 ratio 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Capital buffer    0.625% 1.25% 1.825% 2.5% 
Countercyclical buffer    Phase-in 
0 to 
2.5% 
G-SIB surcharge    Phase-in 
1.0 to 
2.5% 
Minimum common 
equity + capital buffer 
3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.0% 
Phase-in deductions 
from CET1 
 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100% 
Minimum Tier 1 capital 4.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 
Minimum total capital 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Minimum total capital 
+ conservation buffer 
8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.5% 
Capital instruments that 
no longer Tier 1 or Tier 2 
Phased out over 10-year horizon beginning 2013 
Liquidity coverage ratio 
LCR 
Observation 
Begins 2011 
Introduce minimum standard by 2015 
Net stable funding ratio 
NSFR 
Observation 
Begins 2011 
  
Introduce minimum 
Standard by 2018 
 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010) 
Notes: The minimum capital requirement increased significantly (4.5% Tier 1 + 2.5% capital buffers). Two new 
liquidity standards (LCR > 100% and NSFR > 100%) and a leverage ratio (3%) have been introduced. Further, new 
charges (2.5% G-SIB surcharge) and a 2.5% countercyclical buffer apply. When the minimum capital requirements, 
capital buffers, and surcharges are added; banks may have as much as 13% capital charge.     
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Another important variable used in the macro stress testing is the capital injection expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. When a bank falls below the hurdle rate (i.e. CAR of 10.5% or 6% of 
Tier 1 capital ratio), it is required to bring its CAR to the minimum capital requirement level 
by available options, one of which is a temporary capital injection (i.e. backstop) provided by 
the government. A bank that fails to raise the necessary capital is assumed to be insolvent.  
ρ = C + IRWA + qI (3.1.4) 
Where C denotes the bank’s current regulatory capital, RWAs are the existing risk-weighted 
assets (i.e. RWA = 8% * (market risk + operational risk) + ∑ W%A&), I is the capital injection 
(as a government intervention or an injection by the bank owners), q is the percent of (I) that 
is put into use immediately to comply with the minimum CAR (P = 10.5% of RWAs).  
I = ρ RWA − C1 − qρ  If C < ρ RWA; I = 0 otherwise (3.1.5) 
If q = 0, then the capital injection (I = 0) is not used, at least not for increasing the RWAs to 
comply with the minimum regulatory CAR (p = 10.50%). If p is substituted with 10.50% in 
the equation, I = 0.105 * RWA – C. If q > 0, the needed capital injection is higher. 
3.2 Credit Risk in the MAST 
At the heart of the traditional banking business lies credit risk, which is the primary risk of 
default by firms and counterparties. Four stress shocks are applied to assess credit risk; 
credit shock 1 is in the baseline scenario. After the necessary adjustments to the provisioning 
standards, the new provisioning rules are the following: 2% for pass loans, 5% for special-
mention loans, 15% for sub-standard loans, 30% for doubtful loans, and 100% for loss loans. 
The value of the collateral is 50%, therefore the assumed haircut is also 50%.  
Credit shock 2 under adverse scenario is applied to the aggregate levels of non-performing 
loans (NPLs), which triggers an across-the-board decline in asset quality. This in turn reduces 
the value of RWAs and capital, putting strain on the banking sector’s ability and capacity to 
absorb losses. The provisioning rates in the baseline scenario are increased; 5% for pass 
loans, 10% for special-mention loans, 25% for sub-standard loans, and 50% for doubtful 
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loans. Banks under the adverse scenario undertake additional provisioning of 38% compared 
to the baseline. Credit shock 3 is applied to several key sectors of the economy. In addition 
to non-performing loans in credit shock (2), a portion of the performing sectoral loans 
become new NPLs. As such, 4% in interbank loans, 2% in general government, 8% 
nonfinancial corporations, 6% domestic sectors, 6% other financial corporations, 4% 
nonresidents, and 4% other. Credit shock 4 is applied to concentration risk to determine the 
number of failures among the largest counterparties (NPLs is 3 under the adverse scenario). 
A bank’s credit exposure and the cost of replacing it is the largest when the counterparty 
defaults. Most large banks use highly sophisticated Monte Carlo simulations to calculate 
credit risk of their lending portfolios. The following is based on (Ieda et al., 2000); 
A bank or a portfolio has n exposures, the default mode can be expressed mathematically; 
L = 0 D&v&1 − r&	
:
&;
 
D& = <1.0 
(Probability P&) 
 
(Probability 1 − P&) 
(3.2.1) 
Where n denotes the number of exposures, p= is the default rate of exposure (i) in the future, 
v& is the amount of exposure, r& is the recovery rate (0 ≤ r& ≤ 1), and L is the portfolio loss 
taking a random variable 1 or 0. If the loss is an indiscrete value, the expected value for L; 
E>L? = 0 P&v&1 − r&	
:
&;
 
 
(3.2.2) 
Where E denotes the expected value for L; differently than in equation (3.2.1), ne is 
sufficiently large whereas the interval between values is sufficiently small. 
The Basel Committee formulated the Standardized Approach (SA-CCR) for measuring 
exposure at default (EAD) for counterparty credit risk (CCR). Mathematically: 
Exposure at default under SA = EAD = alpha * (RC + PFE)  (3.2.3) 
Where RC represents the replacement cost, PFE is the potential future exposure, alpha equals 
1.4. If the bank owes a counterparty money it has no exposure to, RC = maxV − C; 0 where 
V is the value of a derivative contract in the netting set and C is the haircut value of net 
collateral held. The replacement cost for margined trades: RC = maxV − C; TH + MTA −
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NICA; 0. Where V and C are defined as unmargined, TH is the positive threshold before there 
is a margin call, and MTA is the transfer amount to satisfy margin call (BCBS, 2014). 
Aziz and Charupat (1998) estimate credit exposure and loss of a portfolio of derivatives via 
Monte Carlo simulation; actual exposure (AE), total exposure (TE), potential exposure (PE). 
AEc, t	 
 max0, Vc, t	  (3.2.4) 
Where V(c, t) denotes the value of contract (c) at time (t), AE(c, t) is the maximum amount of 
loss at default or replaced at (t). The potential exposure is an additional maximum amount of 
loss at default that occurs not at time (t), at time τ which is between t and maturity (T): 
 
(3.2.5) 
Where PV∗	 represents the function transforming future values to present values (PV) at 
time (t). Total exposure (TE) is the maximum potential loss at time (t). Mathematically; 
TEc, t	 
 AEc, t	  PEc, t	 (3.2.6) 
The loss cannot be greater than the total exposure which includes present and future.  
3.3 Interest Rate Risk in the MAST 
The paper uses “gap” and “duration” techniques from (Čihák, 2007) to measure the direct 
interest rate risk arising from maturity and repricing mismatches. Assets and liabilities are 
sorted into three time-to-repricing buckets (0-3, 3-6, and 6-12 months), and “duration” 
method is used to calculate the impact of interest rate changes on bonds. 
∆ArJ	
ArJ	 ≅
4DJ∆rJ
1  rJ	    ,
∆LrL	
LrL	 ≅
4DL∆rL
1  rL	 (3.3.1) 
Where DJ and DL represent duration, ArJ	 and LrL	 are the values of assets and liabilities 
of the banking sector, and rJ and rL are the annual interest rates of assets and liabilities. 
To examine the adverse effect of interest sensitivities of assets on capital adequacy ratio, the 
above formula is rewritten as; 
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∆>C(rJ, rL)/AOP(rJ)?
∆rJ ≅ −
(L/AOP)
1 + rJ  
(3.3.2) 
QDJ − DL 1 + rJ1 + rL   
∆rL
∆rJR 
1 − ∆AOPAOP   
C
∆C
1 − ∆AA   
C
∆C
 
The thesis assumes that risk-weighted assets move proportionately to total assets. Based on 
the assumption that ∆AOP/AOP = ∆A/A, the equation in 3.3.2 can be simplified as; 
∆>C(rJ, rL)/AOP(rJ)?
∆rJ ≅ −
(L/AOP)
1 + rJ GAPT (3.3.3) 
As the final equation, the duration gap can be defined as; 
GAPT = DJ − DL 1 + rJ1 + rL   
∆rL
∆rJ (3.3.4) 
Banks make money by moving low-interest short-term liabilities into long-term higher 
interest rate assets. The ineffective management of this process could lead to severe maturity 
mismatches between interest sensitive assets and liabilities when interest rates increase. To 
avoid that, the following conditions must be maintained: DJ ≫ DL   , rJ > rL   and   GAPJ > 0. 
3.4 Foreign Exchange Risk in the MAST 
As in Čihák (2007), the thesis measures the impact of an exchange rate shock on the capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) for annual basis from 2013Q1 to 2015Q4. Several assumptions have 
been made; the capital (C) and the risk-weighted assets (AOP) are in domestic currency units; 
a depreciation in the exchange rate (e) results in a proportional decline in the value of the net 
open position (F); this in turn adversely affect capitalization and leads to a reduction in 
capital: ∆e/e = ∆F/F, where F ≠ 0   and  ∆C/∆F = 1 
∆>C(e)/AOP(e)?
∆e ≅
F
e AOP − C
∆AOP∆C  
F
e
AOP ≅
1
e  
F
C 
C
AOP  Q1 −
∆AOP
∆C  
C
AOPR 
(3.4.1) 
Where ∆C/∆e = ∆F/∆e = F/e and the symbol ≅ indicates that the equation is an approximation 
for larger than infinitesimal fluctuations. The above equation can be simplified as; 
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∆>C(e)/AOP(e)? ≅ ∆\\  
]
^  
^
_`a  Q1 −
∆AOP
∆C  
C
AOPR (3.4.2) 
Where ∆AOP/∆C reflects the degree of proportional movements of capital and the risk-
weighted assets. When ∆AOP/∆C = 0, it means that capital and the risk-weighted assets did 
not have a co-movement, in other words, while no change occurred in the value of risk-
weighted assets, the change in capital equals the exchange rate shock times the net open 
position to capital (F/C) and capital adequacy ratio (C/AOP). This is a linear approximation, 
it would not be suitable for large banks where the impact on capital tends to be non-linear.  
Banks’ risk exposures to foreign exchange risk is more manageable than credit and market 
risks. The BNM imposes limits on transactions and positions related to foreign exchange, 
therefore the direct depreciation effect as well as solvency risk is rather small. Besides the 
direct foreign exchange risk, indirect foreign exchange risk can arise from a depreciation or 
appreciation in corporations’ assets and liabilities in foreign currencies.  
Next, the indirect foreign exchange risk in Malaysia’s banking sector is assessed. Denoted the 
debt of the corporate sector (Dbe), equity (Ebe), open exchange position (Fbe), and made the 
very same assumptions in the formulation of the direct foreign exchange risk previously;   
∆Eb/∆e = ∆Fb/∆e = F/e , the impact of indirect exchange risk on corporate leverage (Db/Eb)             
∆>Db(e)/Eb(e)?
∆e ≅
∆Db∆Eb  
Fbe Eb − Db
Fbe
Eb ≅ −
1
e
Fb
Eb  Q
Db
Eb −
∆Db
∆Eb R 
(3.4.3) 
The corporate sector’s leverage increases if it is in short position and the exchange rate 
depreciates. Indirect foreign exchange risk on the NPL/TL ratio can be computed since the 
corporate leverage and the NPL to total loans (TL) ratio is positively correlated; 
∆(NPL/TL) ≅ a∆>Db(e)/Eb(e)? ≅ − ∆ee
Fb
Eb (3.4.4) 
Where ∆(NPL/TL)/∆(Db/Eb) = a > 0 when ∆Db/Eb = 0 Boss et al. (2004) empirically show 
that the change in the NPL/TL ratio equals the change in exchange rate times the net FX open 
position and times the parameter (a). Credit shocks under adverse scenarios have the 
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potential of moving the existing performing loans into non-performing category, and to 
assess the impact on capital, differentiate C/AOP by substituting for NPL/TL in 3.4.4; 
∆ Q CAOPR ≅
∆e
e
TL
AOP  Q1 4
C
AOP  
∆AOP
∆C R π
Fb
Eb  a Q
Db
Eb 4
∆Db
∆EbR 
(3.4.5) 
Where the assumption are made that the additional provisions are expressed as a fixed percentage 
of NPLs (π) and deducted from capital; this increases banks’ vulnerability. 
4. Results and Discussion 
Malaysia’s banking sector, in terms of domicile commercial banking groups, is only about 
one-third of what it was in 1986; after a banking overhaul, the number has been reduced to 
8 from 22 in the 1980s (see Figure 2). The banking consolidation was not just confined to 
banks; other financial and non-financial institutions also underwent consolidation. 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis; data is from BNM and IMF (2013) 
Figure 2: Malaysian Banking Sector Structure (by asset share) 
Malaysia’s banking sector is well capitalized; the aggregate risk-weighted CAR of 15.41% is 
an indication that banks are profitable and committed to meeting the Basel III capital minima 
of 10.5% (8% total capital plus 2.5% capital buffer) before the 2019 deadline (see Figure 3).  
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Source: Author’s analysis; data is from BNM and IMF (2013) 
Figure 3: Pre-Stress Testing Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR %) 
The average CAR of Malaysia’s banking sector from 2011 to 2015 is 15.41%. Although this is 
below the ASEAN-5 average of 16.73%, it is nevertheless at least two percentage points 
higher than those of banking sectors in advanced economies. 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis; data is from BNM and IMF (2013) 
Figure 4: Pre-Stress Testing Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%) 
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Higher CAR and Tier 1 capital ratio underpinned by the BNM’s strong regulation and banking 
supervision helped Malaysia to escape the GFC with a minor dent in its economy. 
 
Table 4: Pre-Stress Testing Financial and Macroeconomic Indicators 
Financial soundness indicators (%) 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 14.57 15.03 15.52 15.04 
Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets 13.21 13.26 13.42 13.30 
Non-performing loans net of provisions to capital 8.34 7.49 6.99 7.61 
Non-performing loans to total gross loans 1.96 1.76 1.62 1.78 
Return on assets (ROA) 1.45 1.53 1.26 1.41 
Return on equity (ROE) 15.52 15.80 12.61 14.64 
Interest margin to gross income 52.88 60.73 61.96 58.52 
Non-interest expenses to gross income 49.85 42.38 46.30 46.18 
Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset ratio) 12.37 13.32 19.26 14.98 
Liquid assets to short term liabilities 38.61 42.09 108.87 63.19 
Net open position in foreign exchange to capital 11.24 14.24 13.88 13.12 
Macroeconomic factors (%) 
Real gross domestic product (GDP) 4.7 6.0 4.8 5.17 
Consumer price index (CPI) 2.1 3.1 2.7 2.63 
General government balances -4.1 -2.7 -3.0 -3.27 
Current account balance 4.0 4.6 2.1 3.57 
Sources: IMF (2014a, b), extracted from IMF Data Warehouse on 7/29/2014  
www.elibrary.imf.org; ** IMF (2015). 
 
 
Malaysia’s banking sector’s gross NPL 
ratio has dropped consecutively since 
2011 (14%), and by 2015, 1.6% NPL is 
lower than ASEAN-5 average of 2.0%. 
Any uncovered portion of the NPLs are 
covered by the collaterals in banks’ 
possession in the event of a default. 
The taper tantrum of May and August rout in 2013, the 5th wave35, have adversely affected 
Malaysia’s financial and macroeconomic indicators and proved that both Malaysia’s banking 
                                                          
35 Asian crisis (1st wave); mortgage debacle of 2006 in the U.S. (2nd wave); the GFC of 2008 (3rd wave); sovereign 
debt crisis in the euro zone (4th wave).   
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sector and its currency (ringgit) are still not immune to exogenous shocks. During the past 
two decades, Malaysia has become ever more susceptible to macro shocks arising from rapid 
boom-and-bust cycles, excessive corporate leverage, household debt, monetary tightening by 
the U.S., asset price volatility, and capital flight to safety (i.e. reversal of capital flows).   
4.1 Results in the Baseline Scenario 
The main results of the MAST in the baseline scenario reveal that Malaysia’s regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks are well-developed. As set out in Table 5, the main results suggest a 
modest change in capital ratios and bank profitability. 
 
Table 5: Summary of Results in Baseline Scenario (%) 
Financial soundness indicators (%) 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Pre-stress test CAR 14.57 15.03 15.52 15.04 
Pre-stress test Tier 1 capital ratio 13.21 13.26 13.42 13.30 
Impact of increase in provisioning -0.25 -0.32 -0.35 -0.31 
Impact of increase in NPLs -0.40 -0.44 -0.46 -0.43 
Impact of increase in interest rates -0.20 -0.30 -0.30 -0.27 
Impact of Exchange rate change -0.50 -0.45 -0.48 -0.48 
Impact of interbank contagion -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 
Change in CAR (all fundamental shocks) -1.45 -1.65 -1.81 -1.64 
Change in Tier 1 ratio (all fundamental shocks) -1.35 -1.42 -1.36 -1.38 
Post-stress test CAR 13.22 13.52 13.93 13.56 
Post-stress test Tier 1 capital ratio 11.86 11.84 12.06 11.92 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio 1.23 1.33 1.17 1.24 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio 13.12 13.30 10.61 12.34 
Pre-stress test liquid assets / total assets 12.37 13.32 19.26 14.98 
Post-stress test liquid assets / total assets 10.30 11.40 16.68 12.79 
Pre-stress test liquid assets / short-term liabilities 38.61 42.09 108.87 63.19 
Post-stress test liquid assets / short-term liabilities 30.58 31.19 92.45 51.41 
Capital injection needed (% of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 
Note: Author’s calculations 
The impact of all fundamental shocks in the post-stress test CAR and Tier 1 capital ratio are 
-1.64% and -1.38% respectively. Even with these adjustments, CAR and Tier 1 ratios of banks 
in Malaysia are still higher than the Basel III minimum capital requirements (i.e. 4.5% CET1, 
6.0% Tier 1, and 8.0% total capital). The rise in funding costs puts strain on bank profitability, 
causing ROA and ROE to decline slightly, -0.15% and -2.30% respectively. Malaysia’s banking 
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sector has a limited exposure to interbank contagion effects since over 80% of the funding 
comes from domestic demand deposits, therefore the level of impact was less than one-third 
of a percent in the baseline scenario. Although a majority of Malaysian banks had sufficient 
liquidity, the top-down (TD) stress test suggested that some smaller (Islamic) banks may face 
illiquidity after five days under highly adverse market conditions.  
 
Table 6: Banking Ratios, Ratings, and PDs in Baseline Scenario 
All figures are on average covering the stress testing horizon (2013-2015) 
Financial soundness indicators Ratios % Ratings* PDs % 
Overall N/A 1.54 3.28 
Total capital / RWA (CAR)  13.56 1.13 2.83 
Tier 1 capital ratio 11.92 1.05 2.83 
NPLs (gross) / total loans 2.08 1.28 5.50 
Provisions / NPLs 95.71 1.93 2.83 
NPLs-provisions / capital 7.61 2.00 4.75 
FX loans / total loans 4.25 1.90 3.67 
RWA / total assets 65.07 1.88 2.92 
ROA (after-tax) 1.24 1.97 2.67 
ROE (after-tax) 12.34 1.88 2.00 
Liquid assets / total assets 12.79 2.30 3.83 
Liquid assets / short-term liabilities 51.41 1.33 2.75 
Net FX exposure / capital  14.31 2.70 3.50 
Note: Author’s calculations 
* 1.00: Low risk; 2.00: Increased risk; 3.00: High risk; 4.00: Very high risk; PD: Probability of default 
The banking ratios illustrated in Table 6 indicate that Malaysia’s banking sector is resilient 
to shocks. The capital raising spree by banks since 2012 has helped offset some of the decline 
in the ROA and ROE ratios. Net foreign exchange exposure saw a 9.1% rise, attributable to 
fast depreciation of ringgit against the US dollar. The average overall rating of 1.54 is strong, 
which is an indication of a low risk. The probability of default (PD) analysis using piecewise 
approach suggests that the financial soundness indicators used in the analysis had low levels 
of contribution to the probability of default. CAR and Tier 1 ratios are robust, as a result they 
receive close to the lowest possible rating of 1.00 (1.13% and 1.05% respectively). The FX 
exposure risk has the largest rating of 2.72, its increased risk is also confirmed by the results 
of the adverse scenario where Malaysia banking sector runs into shortfall of dollar liquidity. 
As expected, credit risk and the resultant losses receive higher PDs; with an average rating of 
5.50, gross NPL to total loans tops the list. The second highest PD of 4.75 is again related to 
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NPLs provisions to capital. Besides credit risk and NPLs, liquidity ratio, FX loans to total loans, 
and net FX risk exposure to capital have received PDs of 3.83, 3.67, and 3.50 respectively.   
4.2 Results in the Adverse Scenario 
The results of adverse and severely scenarios are compared and contrasted against the main 
results of the baseline scenario. The MAST results in adverse scenario indicate that credit risk 
by far is the largest driver behind financial losses. As a result, CAR and Tier 1 capital ratio 
saw significant decreases, -3.80% and -3.37% respectively. These results are well in line with 
the range of 200-560 bps (or 2% to 5.6%) shrinkage in capital ratios provided by the IMF’s 
FSAPs. The five adverse shocks affecting Malaysia’s banking sector, the average impact of an 
increase in provisioning on bank capital ratios is the largest (-1.32%), increase in interest 
rates (-0.77%), increase in NPLs (-0.64%), impact of exchange rate change – FX risk (-0.65%), 
and the impact of interbank contagion (-0.45%). Bank profitability was hit hard pushing both 
ROA (-0.54%) and ROE (-1.55) ratios into negative territory relevant to the baseline.     
 
Table 7: Summary of Results in Adverse Scenario (%) 
 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Baseline scenario CAR 13.22 13.52 13.93 13.56 
Baseline scenario Tier 1 capital ratio 13.05 13.12 13.20 13.12 
Impact of increase in provisioning -1.27 -1.39 -1.29 -1.32 
Impact of increase in NPLs -0.66 -0.72 -0.55 -0.64 
Impact of increase in interest rates -0.80 -0.75 -0.77 -0.77 
Impact of Exchange rate change -0.72 -0.63 -0.60 -0.65 
Impact of interbank contagion -0.40 -0.52 -0.42 -0.45 
Change in CAR (all fundamental shocks) -3.85 -4.01 -3.53 -3.80 
Change in Tier 1 ratio (all fundamental shocks) -3.48 -3.35 -3.28 -3.37 
Post-stress test CAR 9.37 9.75 10.41 9.84 
Post-stress test Tier 1 capital ratio 9.57 9.77 9.92 9.75 
Return on assets (ROA) -0.44 -0.66 -0.51 -0.54 
Return on equity (ROE) -1.28 -1.64 -1.72 -1.55 
Liquid assets / total assets 2.30 3.40 2.68 2.79 
Liquid assets / short-term liabilities 6.11 9.28 78.25 31.21 
Capital injection needed (% of GDP) 1.62 1.71 1.52 1.62 
Note: Author’s calculations 
The aggregate capital shortfall as in the needed capital injection (cost to the government) is 
1.55% of GDP ($4.59 billion of capital injection based on 2015 GDP of $296.22 billion). The 
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most important conclusion of the adverse scenario is that no bank failed (even smaller 
Islamic banks), faced a forced liquidation or suspension of license. 
 
Table 8: Banking Ratios, Ratings, and PDs in Adverse Scenario 
All figures are on average covering the stress testing horizon (2013-2015) 
Financial soundness indicators Ratios % Ratings* PDs % 
Overall N/A 3.72 11.25 
Total capital / RWA (CAR)  9.84 2.39 8.50 
Tier 1 capital ratio 9.62 2.28 8.50 
NPLs (gross) / total loans 3.44 3.58 10.50 
Provisions / NPLs 76.95 3.85 10.83 
NPLs-provisions / capital 5.49 3.55 10.58 
FX loans / total loans 4.89 3.58 10.75 
RWA / total assets 67.67 3.17 11.25 
ROA (after-tax) -0.54 3.90 11.75 
ROE (after-tax) -1.55 3.65 12.42 
Liquid assets / total assets -1.79 3.78 13.75 
Liquid assets / short-term liabilities 22.39 3.97 15.75 
Net FX exposure / capital  16.15 3.35 13.50 
Note: Author’s calculations 
* 1.00: Low risk; 2.00: Increased risk; 3.00: High risk; 4.00: Very high risk; PD: Probability of default 
The number of defaults by private sector on corporate loans and by households on mortgage 
loans impinged banking profitability. Consequently, intentional capital hoarding by banks led 
to disintermediation, this in turn accelerated evaporation of liquidity fast. The average 
liquidity ratio of -1.79% along with substantially reduced liquid assets to short-term 
liabilities (22.39%) inhibited banks’ ability to honor their short-term liabilities.  
Despite the overall average rating of 3.72 (i.e. very high risk), massive loan losses and funding 
freeze, CAR (9.84%) and Tier 1 capital ratio (9.75%) are still higher than the Basel III capital 
minima of 7.0% effective by 2015. Strong capital position of Malaysia’s banking sector is also 
confirmed by the ratings of CAR (i.e. 2.39) and Tier 1 ratio (i.e. 2.28), which are the only 
ratings below the 3.0 mark. The probability of default analysis in adverse scenario points to 
a significant increase in banks’ vulnerability to shocks; however, the results are expected and 
in the right direction. The analyses such as banking ratios, ratings, and probability of default 
can be viewed as early-warning indicators to show bank executives and risk managers what 
areas to focus to mitigate losses in an acute stress before going irreversibly out of control. 
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4.3 Results in the Severely Adverse Scenario 
The average levels of CAR and Tier 1 worsened further in severely adverse scenario. At the 
conclusion of severely adverse scenario, banks experienced capital decreases ranging from 
505 bps to 544 bps. When the results are compared with those in the baseline scenario, the 
magnitude of average decrease is more than threefold; -1.64% (CAR) and -1.38% (Tier 1) 
versus -5.31% and -5.12% respectively. Even after severely adverse scenario, the aggregate 
CAR and Tier 1 ratio remained surprisingly high; 8.13% and 8.01% respectively. 
Table 9: Summary of Results in Severely Adverse Scenario (%) 
 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Baseline scenario CAR 13.22 13.52 13.93 13.56 
Baseline scenario Tier 1 capital ratio 13.05 13.12 13.20 13.12 
Impact of increase in provisioning -1.54 -1.69 -1.58 -1.60 
Impact of increase in NPLs -1.05 -0.96 -1.00 -1.00 
Impact of increase in interest rates -1.25 -1.30 -1.18 -1.24 
Impact of Exchange rate change -1.00 -0.88 -0.85 -0.91 
Impact of interbank contagion -0.60 -0.55 -0.50 -0.55 
Change in CAR (all fundamental shocks) -5.44 -5.38 -5.11 -5.31 
Change in Tier 1 ratio (all fundamental shocks) 5.10 5.20 5.05 5.12 
Post-stress test CAR 7.78 8.14 8.82 8.25 
Post-stress test Tier 1 capital ratio 7.95 7.92 8.15 8.01 
Return on assets (ROA) -5.15 -4.86 -4.74 -4.92 
Return on equity (ROE) -3.48 -3.64 -3.52 -3.55 
Liquid assets / total assets -10.40 -9.90 -9.86 -10.05 
Liquid assets / short-term liabilities -12.15 -11.70 28.30 1.48 
Capital injection needed (% of GDP) 3.51 3.69 3.44 3.55 
Note: Author’s calculations 
The main results of the severely adverse scenario are in line with the IMF results through the 
Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSSA) on Malaysia in 2013. All fundamental shocks 
applied in severely adverse scenario resulted in sizable reductions in banks’ capital ratios, an 
average shrinkage of 5.31% in CAR and 5.12% in Tier 1 ratio; this is also consistent with the 
impact range of 200-560 bps provided by the IMF. Large banks’ capitalization needs become 
more significant on account of a capital shortfall of $10.52 billion (or 3.55% of 2015 GDP). In 
the adverse scenario, some smaller banks needed to raise capital to comply with the 10.5%; 
in the severely adverse scenario, even some larger banks needed to raise fresh capital. 
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The average levels of CAR and Tier 1 worsened in the severely adverse scenario; 8.25% and 
8.01% respectively. The level of non-performing loans more than triples reaching 5.46%, 
attributable to severe loan losses plus significantly reduced provisions to NPLs (from 95.71% 
in baseline scenario to 76.95% in adverse scenario, and 59.13% in the severely adverse 
scenario). During the worst episode of shocks, banks saw their returns on assets and equity 
plummet to their lowest levels; -4.92% (ROA) and -3.55% (ROE). In this scenario, not only 
smaller banks but also larger banks are subject to illiquidity as some banks’ capital hoarding 
is believed to cause funding freeze (i.e. drying-up liquidity fast) and make some banks’ Tier1 
ratio fall below the critical benchmark rate of 6.0%.   
 
Table 10: Banking Ratios, Ratings, and PDs in Severely Adverse Scenario 
All figures are on average covering the stress testing horizon (2013-2015) 
Financial soundness indicators Ratios % Ratings* PDs % 
Overall N/A 3.78 14.03 
Total capital / RWA (CAR)  9.84 2.56 10.45 
Tier 1 capital ratio 9.62 2.43 10.51 
NPLs (gross) / total loans 5.46 3.80 13.42 
Provisions / NPLs 59.13 3.92 13.73 
NPLs-provisions / capital 5.49 3.73 13.80 
FX loans / total loans 5.60 3.68 14.28 
RWA / total assets 69.74 3.40 13.58 
ROA (after-tax) -4.92 3.90 14.87 
ROE (after-tax) -3.55 3.88 15.30 
Liquid assets / total assets -10.05 3.88 16.83 
Liquid assets / short-term liabilities 1.48 4.00 18.72 
Net FX exposure / capital  14.14 3.58 15.33 
Note: Author’s calculations 
* 1.00: Low risk; 2.00: Increased risk; 3.00: High risk; 4.00: Very high risk; PD: Probability of default 
The overall rating in the severely adverse scenario approaches the very high risk mark of 4.0 
(i.e. 3.78), however the ratings of CAR (2.56) and Tier 1 (2.43) are still below the high risk 
mark of 3.0, this is an indication of banks’ strong capital positions. Therefore, these ratings 
by any means do not suggest that some banks might be at risk of insolvency; conversely, a 
great majority of Malaysia’ banks are stable with high public confidence. The main results of 
the probability of default analyses point to an increasing level of defaults, mainly fostered by 
a cascade of defaults taken place in the private sector on corporate loans and by households 
on residential mortgage loans (i.e. no bank has become insolvent or faced liquidation).   
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4.4 Statistical Analysis of the Macro Stress Testing Results 
The analyses reveal that the banking sector’s FSIs noticeably deteriorate in adverse scenario 
and worsen further in the severely adverse scenario. The main outcomes of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test (K-S test) indicate that the assumption of normality is met, as the Sig. p-values 
(.155, .174, and .812) > 0.05; the null hypothesis36 would be retained and concluded that the 
difference in means between the three stress scenarios is not significantly different.  
 
Table 11: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Stress Scenarios 
 Baseline Adverse Severely Adverse 
N 14 14 14 
Normal Parameters 
Mean 7.0452 3.0100 -.1955 
Std. Deviation 14.13225 9.12176 5.15013 
Most Extreme Differences 
Absolute .302 .295 .170 
Positive .302 .295 .170 
Negative -.269 -.228 -.107 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.131 1.104 .637 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .155 .174 .812 
Notes: Author’s analysis 
As illustrated in Table 12, excluding the baseline (t = -.782, Sig. p (.448) > 0.05), the results 
are statistically significant in adverse scenario (t = -.2.867, Sig. p (.013) < 0.05) and severely 
adverse scenario (t = -.7.407, Sig. p (.000) < 0.05). In the former, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis because the significance level is greater than the priori alpha of .05. In the latter 
two, the null hypothesis is rejected and concluded that the difference is significant. 
 
Table 12: One-Sample Test of Stress Test Scenarios 
 Test Value = 10 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Baseline -.782 13 .448 -2.95476 -11.1145 5.2050 
Adverse -2.867 13 .013 -6.99000 -12.2567 -1.7233 
Severely Adverse -7.407 13 .000 -10.19548 -13.1691 -7.2219 
Notes: Author’s analysis 
                                                          
36 H0: There is positive relationship between macro stress testing and financial stability. 
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We analyzed macro factors to assess their impact on financial stability of Malaysia’s banking 
sector. Except crude oil (p = 0.151 > .05) and NASDAQ (p = 0.170 > .05), all other indexes are 
significant in explaining variations in the performance of KLCI. Based on the Sig. F (p = 0.000 
< .05), the F-test is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. Multiple R (0.970) indicates 
that the correlation between KLCI (dependent) and major indexes (independent variables) 
are positive. The figure being very close to +1 implies that the correlation is significant. The 
coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.941, which can be interpreted that 94% of the change 
in the dependent variable Y (performance of KLCI) is explained by independent variable X. 
 
Table 13: Regression Analysis of KLCI and Major Indexes 
Regression statistics      
Multiple R 0.970     
R Square 0.941     
Adjusted R Square 0.940     
Standard Error 97.01744     
Observations 1000     
ANOVA 
     
 df SS MS F Sig. F  
Regression 10 148518550.9 14851855.0 1577.906 0.000  
Residual 989 9308847.4 9412.384    
Total 999 157827398.3     
 
KLCI Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Crude Oil -0.405 0.282 -1.436 0.151 -0.958 0.148 
Gold 0.483 0.025 19.324 0.000 0.434 0.532 
S&P500 0.374 0.063 5.952 0.000 0.251 0.497 
DJIA 0.011 0.005 2.159 0.031 0.001 0.021 
Nasdaq 0.016 0.012 1.373 0.170 -0.007 0.039 
FTSE -0.180 0.012 -14.720 0.000 -0.204 -0.156 
DAX 0.016 0.008 2.001 0.046 0.000 0.032 
CAC -0.051 0.008 -6.254 0.000 -0.067 -0.035 
N225 0.034 0.001 25.126 0.000 0.031 0.036 
Hang Seng 0.032 0.002 17.046 0.000 0.028 0.035 
Notes: Author’s calculations; Dependable Variable : KLCI - Kuala Lumpur Composite Index 
S&P: Standard and Poor’s (US); DJIA: Dow Jones Industrial Average (US); Nasdaq: National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (US); FTSE: Financial Times Stock Exchange (UK); DAX: Deutsche 
Boerse AG German Stock Index; CAC: Cotation Assistée en Continu (France); N225: Nikkei 225 stock 
exchange (Japan); Hang Seng: Stock market index (Hong Kong). 
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Table 14: Correlations among KLCI and Major Indexes 
  KLCI Crude Oil Gold S&P 500 DJIA NASDAQ FTSE DAX CAC N225 Hang Seng 
P
e
a
r
s
o
n
 
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
KLCI 1.000 0.794 0.865 0.577 0.661 0.601 0.415 0.673 -0.045 -0.003 0.847 
Crude Oil 0.794 1.000 0.851 0.550 0.695 0.492 0.432 0.650 0.135 -0.314 0.866 
Gold 0.865 0.851 1.000 0.465 0.603 0.488 0.345 0.602 -0.127 -0.377 0.777 
S&P500 0.577 0.550 0.465 1.000 0.934 0.927 0.881 0.929 0.611 0.109 0.678 
DJIA 0.661 0.695 0.603 0.934 1.000 0.834 0.761 0.899 0.493 -0.088 0.743 
NASDAQ 0.601 0.492 0.488 0.927 0.834 1.000 0.821 0.899 0.544 0.147 0.657 
FTSE 0.415 0.432 0.345 0.881 0.761 0.821 1.000 0.891 0.740 0.248 0.626 
DAX 0.673 0.650 0.602 0.929 0.899 0.899 0.891 1.000 0.594 0.067 0.809 
CAC -0.045 0.135 -0.127 0.611 0.493 0.544 0.740 0.594 1.000 0.191 0.329 
N225 -0.003 -0.314 -0.377 0.109 -0.088 0.147 0.248 0.067 0.191 1.000 -0.047 
Hang Seng 0.847 0.866 0.777 0.678 0.743 0.657 0.626 0.809 0.329 -0.047 1.000 
S
i
g
.
 
(
1
 
t
a
i
l
e
d
)
 
KLCI  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.467 0.000 
Crude Oil 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Gold 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
S&P500 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DJIA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
NASDAQ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FTSE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DAX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.017 0.000 
CAC 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
N225 0.467 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000  0.070 
Hang Seng 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.070  
N
 
(
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
s
i
z
e
)
 
KLCI 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Crude Oil 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Gold 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
S&P500 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
DJIA 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
NASDAQ 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
FTSE 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
DAX 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
CAC 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
N225 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Hang Seng 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Notes: Author’s calculations (IBM SPSS, version 20) 
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As illustrated in Table 14, the negative coefficient (oil = -0.405) suggests that for every unit 
of increase in the price of oil, a decrease of 0.40% would be expected on average in the level 
of KLCI. Similarly, due to inverse correlations and negative coefficients, increases in FTSE (-
0.181) and CAC (-0.051) would have adverse impact on the valuation of KLCI. The variables 
such as NASDAQ, DJIA, and DAX are not statistically significant in explaining the variations in 
KLCI performance. Only interactions between Malaysia’s KLCI and CAC (-0.405) and N225 (-
0.003) are negatively correlated, and the difference in means between KLCI and these two 
indexes is not statistically significant as the p values (0.076 and 0.467) > .05. The rest of the 
correlations are positive and the results are statistically significant. 
 
Table 15: Regression Analysis of Ringgit and Major Currencies 
Regression statistics      
Multiple R 0.966     
R Square 0.934     
Adjusted R Square 0.931     
Standard Error 0.1094198     
Observations 240     
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F Sig. F  
Regression 10 38.577 3.858 322.207 0.000  
Residual 229 2.742 0.012    
Total 239 41.319        
 
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
USD-IDR 0.251 0.237 1.059 0.291 -0.216 0.718 
USD-PHP 0.000 0.000 17.739 0.000 0.000 0.000 
USD-SGD -0.018 0.003 -6.055 0.000 -0.024 -0.012 
USD-THB 2.411 0.242 9.963 0.000 1.934 2.888 
USD-EUR 0.022 0.004 5.773 0.000 0.015 0.030 
USD-GBP 0.477 0.220 2.168 0.031 0.043 0.910 
USD-JPY -0.747 0.295 -2.530 0.012 -1.328 -0.165 
USD-CHF -0.002 0.001 -1.695 0.091 -0.003 0.000 
USD-AUD -0.755 0.151 -5.013 0.000 -1.051 -0.458 
USD-CAD -0.427 0.129 -3.300 0.001 -0.682 -0.172 
Notes: Author’s calculations (IBM SPSS, version 20) 
Dependent Variable: USD-MYR; MYR: Malaysia ringgit; DR: Indonesia rupiah; PHP: Philippines peso; 
SGD: Singapore dollar; THB: Thailand baht; EUR: Europe euro; GBP: Great Britain pound; JPY: Japan yen; 
CHF: Switzerland frank; AUD: Australia dollar; CAD: Canada dollar.   
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Table 16: Correlations among MYR and Major Currencies 
  USD-MYR USD-IDR USD-PHP USDSGD USD-THB USD-EUR USD-GBP USD-JPY USD-CHF USD-AUD USD-CAD 
P
e
a
r
s
o
n
 
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
USD-MYR 1.000 0.607 0.729 0.705 0.867 0.496 -0.011 0.469 0.419 0.608 0.450 
USD-IDR 0.607 1.000 0.601 -0.026 0.347 0.048 0.069 -0.034 -0.265 0.023 -0.194 
USD-PHP 0.729 0.601 1.000 0.503 0.699 0.209 -0.160 0.094 0.142 0.301 0.061 
USDSGD 0.705 -0.026 0.503 1.000 0.857 0.719 0.036 0.664 0.877 0.884 0.805 
USD-THB 0.867 0.347 0.699 0.857 1.000 0.674 0.101 0.518 0.654 0.772 0.615 
USD-EUR 0.496 0.048 0.209 0.719 0.674 1.000 0.566 0.557 0.838 0.886 0.846 
USD-GBP -0.011 0.069 -0.160 0.036 0.101 0.566 1.000 -0.069 0.228 0.382 0.388 
USD-JPY 0.469 -0.034 0.094 0.664 0.518 0.557 -0.069 1.000 0.649 0.688 0.705 
USD-CHF 0.419 -0.265 0.142 0.877 0.654 0.838 0.228 0.649 1.000 0.894 0.868 
USD-AUD 0.608 0.023 0.301 0.884 0.772 0.886 0.382 0.688 0.894 1.000 0.922 
USD-CAD 0.450 -0.194 0.061 0.805 0.615 0.846 0.388 0.705 0.868 0.922 1.000 
S
i
g
.
 
(
1
 
t
a
i
l
e
d
)
 
USD-MYR  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
USD-IDR 0.000  0.000 0.342 0.000 0.227 0.143 0.302 0.000 0.363 0.001 
USD-PHP 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.072 0.014 0.000 0.173 
USDSGD 0.000 0.342 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
USD-THB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
USD-EUR 0.000 0.227 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
USD-GBP 0.434 0.143 0.007 0.292 0.060 0.000  0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 
USD-JPY 0.000 0.302 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.144  0.000 0.000 0.000 
USD-CHF 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
USD-AUD 0.000 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
USD-CAD 0.000 0.001 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
N
 
(
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
s
i
z
e
)
 
USD-MYR 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-IDR 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-PHP 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USDSGD 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-THB 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-EUR 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-GBP 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-JPY 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-CHF 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-AUD 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
USD-CAD 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Note: Author’s calculations (IBM SPSS, version 20) 
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The results of the regression analysis of Malaysia’s ringgit and ten major currencies are set 
out in Table 15. Multiple R (0.966) indicates that the correlation between ringgit - MYR 
(dependent Y) and ten major currency indexes (independent X) are positive. The correlation 
figure is close to +1 which implies that the correlation between ringgit and other currencies 
is significant. The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.934 can be interpreted that 93% of 
the change in the dependent Y (performance of ringgit) is explained by independent X. 
The standard error of the regression (0.1094198) is an estimate that explains the variation 
in the performance of MYR. The indexes are statistically significant in explaining variations 
in the performance of ringgit; USD-PHP (p = 0.000 < 0.05), USD-SGD (p = 0.000 < 0.05), USD-
THB (p = 0.000 < 0.05), USD-EUR (p = 0.000 < 0.05), USD-GBP (p = 0.031 < 0.05), USD-JPY (p 
= 0.012 < 0.05), USD-AUD (p = 0.000 < 0.05), and USD-CAD (p = 0.001 < 0.05). Only USD-IDR 
(p = 0.291 > 0.05) and USD-CHF (p = 0.091) were not statistically significant; the Sig. F (p = 
0.000 < 0.05), the F-test was significant and the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Between the currency pairs (as shown in Table 16), only USD-MYR and USD-GBP (-0.011) are 
negatively correlated, therefore not statistically significant. The remaining currency pairs are 
positively correlated and the results are statistically significant. The negative correlation 
coefficients suggested that for every unit of increase in the exchange rates of SGD, JPY, CHF, 
AUD, and CAD against the dollar; a decrease in exchange rates would be expected by the 
associated values in the level of MYR. Looking at the correlations, the correlation between 
USD-MYR and USD-GBP was not statistically significant due to p = 0.434 > 0.05. 
Ringgit had strong correlations with the currencies of peers, attributable to high regional 
integration as well as close trade and cultural ties across ASEAN-5. USD-BHT (0.867) had the 
highest correlations among the independent variables followed by USD-PHP (0.729), USD-
SGD (0.705), USD-AUD (0.608), USD-IDR (0.607), and USD-EUR (0.496); USD-GBP was only 
negative correlation (-0.011). The largest variations in MYR are explained by the inverse 
correlations between USD-MYR and USD-AUD and USD-JPY. USD-HBT (2.411) are not 
statistically significant in explaining the ringgit’s performance.    
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5. Conclusion 
The macro stress testing results under the baseline scenario (i.e. not a real stress scenario) 
revealed a modest change in the aggregate capital ratios and bank profitability. Impact of the 
extreme but plausible and hypothetical shocks on capital ratios was a fall of -1.64% on CAR 
and -1.38% on Tier 1 capital ratio; post-stress test CAR and Tier 1 were 13.56% and 11.92% 
respectively. Even taking downward adjustments into account, CAR and Tier 1 ratios of 
banks are at least two percentage points higher than the Basel III minimum capital 
requirement of 10.5% effective as of 2019. Rising funding costs due to regulatory tightening 
pressured bank profitability, banks’ ROA in the aggregate dropped slightly from 1.41% to 
1.24% (a change of -0.17%) and ROE similarly declined from 14.64% to 12.34% (a change 
of -2.30%).  
Net foreign exchange exposure risk in the baseline scenario surprisingly grew from 13.12% 
to 14.31% (an increase of 9.1%); this was mainly attributable to the fast depreciation of 
Malaysian ringgit against other major currencies (USD and EUR in particular). The rating of 
financial soundness indicators (FSIs) of the banking sector received an overall rating of 1.54, 
which indicates a strong resilience to shocks; both CAR and Tier 1 had low-risk ratings, 1.13 
and 1.05 respectively. Liquid assets to short-term liabilities saw a rating of 1.33 which meant 
that Malaysia’s banking sector had sufficient liquidity. The probability of default analysis in 
the baseline scenario identified some issues; net foreign exchange exposure to capital and 
liquid assets to total assets received 2.70 and 2.30 respectively (3.0 meant high risk). Despite 
strong CAR and Tier 1, their PD rating of 2.83 meant that the pre-adjustments in the baseline 
scenario prior to the start of adverse scenarios negatively affected capital ratios. Credit risk 
and the resultant losses received higher PDs; in that regard, gross NPLs to total loans with 
the PD rating of 5.50 was on top of the list (4.0 meant very high risk). 
The impact of all fundamental shocks on capital ratios in the adverse scenario was noticeably 
higher. Namely, capital deterioration was significant; CAR and Tier 1 capital ratio declined 
significantly, by -3.80% and -3.37% respectively. The aggregate capital shortfall in the form 
of needed capital injection (the cost of insolvent banks to the government) was 1.55% of GDP 
(approximately $4.59 billion of capital injection based on $296.22 billion). Nevertheless, the 
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important finding of the adverse scenario was that no bank failed, faced a forced liquidation 
or suspension of banking license. Among the adverse shocks affecting the banking sector, the 
average impact of increase in provisioning on bank capital ratios was the largest (-1.32%), 
followed by an increase in interest rates (-0.77%), increase in NPLs (-0.64%), impact of 
exchange rate change – FX risk (-0.65%), and the impact of interbank contagion (-0.45%). 
Profitability was hit hard in adverse scenario due to lower real estate and asset prices plus 
higher unemployment; as a result, ROA and ROE ratios were pushed into negative territory 
relevant to the baseline (-0.54% and -1.44% respectively).    
The overall average rating of 3.72 approached the high-risk rating of 4.0 in adverse scenario. 
The augmentation of risk was cross the board, which suggested that capitalization needs of 
banks were significant. Despite massive loan losses and funding freeze, the capital ratios 
remained higher than the Basel III capital minima; 9.84% of CAR and 9.62% of Tier 1 capital 
ratio were still sufficient to meet the Basel III target ratio of 7.0% (4.5% of CET1 plus 2.5% 
of capital buffer). Banks would have to raise new funds to meet the higher capital ratio of 
10.5% by 2019. The resilience of CAR and Tier 1 capital ratio was confirmed by the ratings 
as well, which were the only FSIs that received a rating of below 3.00 (2.39 and 2.28 
respectively). The results in all three scenarios revealed that credit risk shocks were more 
significant for Malaysia’s banking sector than market risk shocks. 
The shrinkage in CAR (-5.31%) and Tier 1 capital ratio (-5.12%) was significant under the 
severely adverse scenario. Even after shedding over 5% each, CAR (8.25%) and Tier 1 ratio 
(8.01%) remained surprisingly resilient. The capitalization needs became more significant 
on account of capital shortfalls of $10.52 billion (or 3.55% of 2015 GDP). In the adverse 
scenario, some smaller Islamic banks only needed to raise fresh capital in order to comply 
with the paper’s 10.5% regulatory capital minima; however in the severely adverse scenario 
the capitalization need was more widespread including larger banks. Banks saw their 
returns on assets and equity plummet to lowest levels, -4.92% (ROA) and -3.55% (ROE). 
This paper differs from the antecedent studies, therefore it is informative to the BNM, the 
supervisory community, and bank executives. BNM must not heavily rely on the substantial 
capital buffers from highly profitable domestic and overseas operations because CAR and 
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Tier 1 capital ratios of banks decreased more than expected in the baseline scenario. Capital 
levels deteriorated further under the two adverse scenarios, this should prompt the BNM 
and individual banks to re-visit their credit risk parameters and make them more 
conservative. The overheated housing market (i.e. asset prices) and the rising household 
leverage must be monitored closely by the BNM, which should also ensure that these 
disquieting areas do not put unnecessary strain on banks’ capital positions. Any funding 
freeze due to capital hoarding by banks and the subsequent credit squeeze could adversely 
affect the broader economy, the resultant contraction in spending in turn may amplify the 
risk of a sovereign debt crisis. 
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